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ABSTRACT
Analysis of inter-procedural data ﬂow (IDF) is a commonly encountered challenge
for verifying safety and security properties of large software. In order to address this
challenge, a pragmatic approach is to identify IDF patterns that are known to occur
in practice, and develop algorithms to detect and handle those patterns correctly. We
perform an empirical study to gather the IDF patterns in Linux, which is essential to
support such a pragmatic approach.
In our study, we ﬁrst analyzed the Linux code to study how reference to dynam-
ically allocated memory in a function ﬂows out of the function. We analyzed instances
of memory allocation and identiﬁed 6 IDF patterns. Second, we mined and analyzed
memory leak bug ﬁxes from the Linux git repository. Third, we surveyed the literature
for static analysis tools that can detect memory leaks. Based on these studies, we found
that the set of IDF patterns associated with the memory leak bug ﬁxes in Linux and
those that can be detected by the current static analysis tools is a subset of the 6 IDF
patterns we identiﬁed.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In program analysis, Data Flow analysis is the process of collecting information about
the way the variables are used, deﬁned in the program. In many cases it is of interest to
know how a particular data item is used after it is deﬁned in a function. For example
the usage of pointer to the allocated memory in a function is of interest to ﬁnd memory
leak. Also, data-ﬂow analysis techniques play an important role in tools for performing
optimization, program understanding and maintenance, software testing, and veriﬁcation
of program properties.
If the analysis of the usage of data item is done within the function where the data
item is deﬁned then it is called Intra-procedural Data Flow analysis. On the other hand,
Inter-procedural data ﬂow analysis extends the scope of data ﬂow analysis across function
boundaries. Figure 1.1 shows function computeAverage() which computes the average
of two numbers and return the result back to the caller function main(). The data in the
variable average which is deﬁned in computeAverage() function ﬂows from it to main
function through return statement, thus requires Inter-procedural data ﬂow analysis to
track the data present in average variable. The data in variable avg which is deﬁned in
computeAveragePrint() remains within the function. Only Intra-procedural data ﬂow
analysis is required to track the data present in avg variable.
2Figure 1.1 Program data ﬂow
The work in this empirical study is motivated to provide answers to the following
questions:
• What are the diﬀerent IDF patterns that must be considered for the automated
static analysis of memory leaks in Linux kernel?
• How frequent are those patterns?
1.1 Thesis Contributions
This thesis provides the following key contributions:
1. The ﬁnding of Inter-procedural Data Flow(IDF) patterns involved in memory leak
analysis and their frequency of occurrence in Linux Operating System.
32. Mining and analysis of memory leak bug ﬁxes in Linux.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 deﬁnes the various IDF
patterns that have been found by our empirical study. Chapter 3 discusses each IDF
pattern with examples from Linux and the challenges associated with each IDF pattern
for memory leak analysis. Chapter 4 discusses our study of Linux memory leak bug ﬁxes.
Chapter 5 discusses our study of the literature survey of current static analysis tools.
Chapter 6 discusses the related work. Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes our work.
4CHAPTER 2. INTER-PROCEDURAL DATA FLOW(IDF)
PATTERNS
When a memory is allocated in a function, a pointer to the memory can escape to
other threads of execution, or to calling functions. There are diﬀerent ways in which a
pointer(p) to an allocated memory inside a function can escape to other functions. We
categorize the escape of variable p from a function into six diﬀerent IDF patterns. In
this chapter we deﬁne each IDF pattern and discuss their detail in next chapter.
In all the following examples of IDF patterns, the memory is allocated in the function
foo and p is a pointer to the allocated memory.
2.1 Parameter Escape(PEsc):
When p or any variable tainted (a variable p taints variable q when p is assigned
to q after the variable p is deﬁned) by it is passed to some other function through its
parameter or returned to caller of foo through one of its arguments then we call it as
parameter escape . Listing 2.1 and listing 2.2 shows an example of parameter escape.
Listing 2.1 Parameter escape to the caller of function foo()
void foo(int *a){
//some code
int *p = malloc(sizeof(int)*10);
a=p;
//some code
}
5Listing 2.2 Parameter escape to the function called by foo()
void foo (){
//some code
int *p = malloc(sizeof(int )*10);
bar(p);
//some code
}
In listing 1 the pointer p is passed to the caller of foo when its argument a is tainted
with p as shown by the statement a = p. In listing 2 the pointer p is escaped to function
bar when function bar is called and p is passed as one of its parameter.
2.2 Return Escape(REsc):
When p or any variable tainted by it is returned from function foo then we classify
such an escape of p as return escape. It is called so because in this case the allocated
memory escapes to the caller of foo through the returned value. Listing 2.3 shows an
example of return escape.
Listing 2.3 Return escape
int* foo(){
//some code
p = malloc(sizeof(int)*10);
//some code
return p;
}
62.3 Global Escape(GEsc):
When p or any variable tainted by it is assigned to a global variable, we classify such
an escape as global escape. Listing 2.4 shows an example of global escape.
Listing 2.4 Global escape
int *g;// global variable
void foo(){
//some code
int *p = malloc(sizeof(int)*10);
g=p;
//some code
}
2.4 Escape Through Function Pointer(FPEsc):
In this type of IDF pattern, the reference to the allocated memory is passed to the
function(f) parameter. The function f is called using function pointer. Listing 2.5 shows
the example of such IDF pattern. This pattern uses only PEsc IDF pattern to escape p.
Listing 2.5 Escape through function pointer
struct{
int a;
int (*fp)(int*);//fp is function pointer
}myStruct;
void foo(myStruct *s){
int p = malloc ();
//some code
7s->fp(p);
//some computational code
return;
}
In listing 5 the highlighted line shows the call through a function pointer and the
pointer to the allocated memory is passed as a parameter.
2.5 Escape By A Pointer To A Field Of Structure(SFEsc):
In this type of IDF pattern, the memory is allocated to a structure s in function foo
and instead of a pointer to the s, a pointer to one of its ﬁelds is passed using any one of
the base IDF pattern from foo. Listing 2.6 shows an example of such IDF pattern.
Listing 2.6 Escape through a ﬁeld of structure
struct{
int a;
struct1 m;
}myStruct;
void foo(){
myStruct* s = malloc(sizeOf(myStruct));
// initialize other members of the structure
return &s->m ;
}
In listing 6 ﬁrst the memory of structure of type myStruct is allocated and assigned
to pointer s. Then the address of ﬁeld m of the structure is returned to the caller of foo.
82.6 Escape By A Pointer Inserted In A Linked List(LLEsc):
When p or any variable tainted by it escapes from function foo by inserting it into
a linked list, we classify such an escape as escape through linked list. Pointer p which
is inserted to the linked list can escape from foo using any of the base IDF pattern. In
listing 2.7 function foo allocates memory to structure of type myStruct and assigns the
address of the allocated memory to variable s. The pointer s is then added to the linked
list l using list_add function.
Listing 2.7 Escape to linked list
//list defined globally
struct list{
list *next , *previous;
}l;
struct myStruct{
int a;
list m;
}
static inline void list_add(struct list_head *new ,struct list_head *
prev ,struct list_head *next) {
next ->prev = new;
new ->next = next;
new ->prev = prev;
prev ->next = new;
}
void foo(){
myStruct *s = malloc(sizeOf(myStruct));
// intialise other members of structure myStruct
list_add(s,l.previous ,l.next);
}
9CHAPTER 3. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH IDF
PATTERNS FOR MEMORY LEAK ANALYSIS IN LINUX
KERNEL
In this chapter, we will show the result of our empirical study on Linux. We will
show the ﬁndings by presenting the example cases of each type of IDF pattern. Also we
will show the frequency of occurrence of these patterns in Linux.
For ﬁnding the IDF patterns we used Linux (version 3.12) as our base software. We
initially used static analysis tool for ﬁnding how the pointer to the allocated memory in
a function escapes out of it. Using our analysis based on static analysis tool, generated
signiﬁcant number of false positives like the one shown in listing 3.1. In the example
shown in listing 3.1 pointer wq points to the allocated memory and taints variable ei− >
socket.wq at line 14. The last statement of the function returns the address of pointer
ei− > vfs inode. Further listing 3.2 shows the recovery of pointer wq from the variable
that was returned by the allocating function sock alloc inode(),which is then freed ﬁnally.
Our tool fails to detect such data ﬂow and shows such type of cases as if the pointer to
the allocated memory has not escaped at all.
To more accurately determine IDF patterns we manually analyzed how the pointer
to the allocated memory escapes out of the function. We have done our study on 838
instances of kmalloc(). Linux uses kmalloc() function call to allocate memory dynami-
cally.
Listing 3.1 False positive from static analysis tool
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1 static struct inode *sock_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) {
2 struct socket_alloc *ei;
3 struct socket_wq *wq;
4 ei = kmem_cache_alloc(sock_inode_cachep , GFP_KERNEL);
5 if (!ei)
6 return NULL;
7 wq = kmalloc(sizeof (*wq), GFP_KERNEL);
8 if (!wq) {
9 kmem_cache_free(sock_inode_cachep , ei);
10 return NULL;
11 }
12 init_waitqueue_head (&wq ->wait);
13 wq->fasync_list = NULL;
14 RCU_INIT_POINTER(ei->socket.wq , wq);
15 ei->socket.state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
16 ei->socket.flags = 0;
17 ei->socket.ops = NULL;
18 ei->socket.sk = NULL;
19 ei->socket.file = NULL;
20 return &ei ->vfs_inode;
21 }
Listing 3.2 Deallocating memory in sock destroy inode()
stat ic void sock_destroy_inode ( struct inode ∗ inode ) {
struct socke t_a l l o c ∗ e i ;
struct socket_wq ∗wq ;
e i = conta iner_of ( inode , struct socket_al loc , vfs_inode ) ;
wq = rcu_dere ference_protected ( e i−>socket .wq , 1) ;
k free_rcu (wq , rcu ) ;
kmem_cache_free ( sock_inode_cachep , e i ) ;
}
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3.1 Example Cases Of IDF Patterns From Linux
In chapter 2 we had deﬁned the IDF patterns, in this chapter we will discuss the IDF
patterns in detail by showing the actual examples of each IDF pattern from Linux.
1. Parameter Escape(PEsc): There are 501 memory allocation instances found in
Linux kernel as shown in ﬁgure 3.3 in which the variable pointing to the address of
allocated memory is escaped through parameter only. Listing 3.3 shows example
case of PEsc in which the pointer to the allocated memory data is passed to the
function usb control message() function. We call it as PEsc to child. For memory
leak analysis it is required to track the pointer in usb control message() as well.
This case as we can see is more challenging than Intra-procedural data ﬂow analysis
for detecting memory leaks.
Listing 3.3 Parameter escape to child function
static void ntrig_report_version(struct hid_device *hdev) {
int ret;
char buf [20];
struct usb_device *usb_dev = hid_to_usb_dev(hdev);
unsigned char *data = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
goto err_free;
ret = usb_control_msg(usb_dev , usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev , 0)
,USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE ,USB_TYPE_CLASS |
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_DIR_IN ,0x30c , 1, data , 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret == 8) {
ret = ntrig_version_string (&data[2], buf);
}
err_free:
kfree(data);
}
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Listing 3.4 shows another example of PEsc IDF pattern in which the pointer to
the allocated memory is passed to the parent(caller) of the function.
Listing 3.4 Parameter escape to parent function
static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs) {
int ret = 1;
int blocksize = 1 << rs ->inode ->i_blkbits;
const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge , u);
//some code
if (rs ->cont_extent) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
rs->buffer = kmalloc(rs->cont_size , GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rs ->buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
bh = sb_bread(rs ->inode ->i_sb , rs ->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs ->buffer , bh ->b_data + rs->cont_offset ,
rs->cont_size);
put_bh(bh);
rs->chr = rs ->buffer;
rs->len = rs->cont_size;
rs->cont_extent = 0;
rs->cont_size = 0;
rs->cont_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
printk("Unable to read rock -ridge attributes\n");
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} out:
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
return ret;
}
In listing 3.4 the highlighted lines shows that memory is allocated to the rs− >
buffer. As pointer rs is the argument of the rock contine function so the reference
to the memory escapes to the callers of rock contine. Once the pointer to the
allocated memory passes to the caller of the function, it is necessary to check all
the callers for memory free. Figure 3.1 shows the reverse call graph (RCG) of
rock contine function. Thus the challenge involves traversing each path of the
RCG of rock contine function to check if allocated memory is freed.
Figure 3.1 Reverse call graph
2. Return Escape(REsc):There are 88 memory allocation instances found in Linux
kernek as shown in ﬁgure 3.3 in which the variable pointing to the address of allo-
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cated memory is escaped through return statement. Listing 3.5 shows an example
case of Return Escape.
Listing 3.5 Return escape Linux example 1
struct nfs_seqid *nfs_alloc_seqid(struct nfs_seqid_counter *
counter , gfp_t gfp_mask) { struct nfs_seqid *new;
new = kmalloc(sizeof (*new), gfp_mask);
if (new != NULL) {
new ->sequence = counter;
INIT_LIST_HEAD (&new ->list);
new ->task = NULL;
}
return new;
}
In listing 3.5 the variable new points to the allocated memory and is escaped to
the caller of nfs alloc seqid function through return statement.The challenge in
handling this IDF pattern for memory leak analysis is similar to that of PEsc to
parent IDF pattern, as the pointer to the allocated memory escapes to the caller
of the function.
Listing 3.6 shows another example case of return escape.
Listing 3.6 Return escape Linux example 2
static void *esp_alloc_tmp(struct crypto_aead *aead , int nfrags ,
int seqihlen) { unsigned int len;
len = seqihlen;
len += crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
//some code
len += sizeof(struct scatterlist) * nfrags;
return kmalloc(len , GFP_ATOMIC);
}
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3. Global Escape(GEsc):There are 25 memory allocation instances found in Linux
kernel as shown in ﬁgure 3.3 in which the variable pointing to the address of
allocated memory is escaped through global variable. Listing 3.7 shows one of
example case of Global Escape.
Listing 3.7 Global escape Linux example 1
static struct usb_class {
struct kref kref;
struct class *class; } *usb_class;
static int init_usb_class(void) {
int result = 0;
if (usb_class != NULL) {
kref_get (&usb_class ->kref);
goto exit;
}
usb_class = kmalloc(sizeof (* usb_class), GFP_KERNEL);
if (! usb_class) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
kref_init (&usb_class ->kref);
usb_class ->class = class_create(THIS_MODULE , "usbmisc");
if(IS_ERR(usb_class ->class)) {
result = PTR_ERR(usb_class ->class);
printk(KERN_ERR "class_create failed for usb 
devices\n");
kfree(usb_class);
usb_class = NULL;
goto exit;
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}
usb_class ->class ->devnode = usb_devnode;
exit:
return result;
}
Listing 3.8 Memory deallocation function
static void release_usb_class(struct kref *kref) {
class_destroy(usb_class ->class);
kfree(usb_class);
usb_class = NULL;
}
In the example shown in listing 3.7 the allocated memory is assigned to variable
usb class which is a pointer to the global structure of type usb class. Once the
reference to the allocated memory is escaped through GEsc pattern, the scope of
access of the memory reference becomes global and can be accessed by all the
functions that can access the global pointer. In this case as the usb class pointer is
statically deﬁned global variable so it can be accessed by all the functions present
in the ﬁle where the pointer is deﬁned. So the challenge for memory leak analysis
not only involves analyzing the callers of the function(init usb class) but also to
analyze all the functions that can refer the global pointer. Listing 3.8 shows the
function the frees the allocated memory.
Listing 3.9 shows another example of global escape in which the address to the
allocated memory is assigned to the global pointer irc_buﬀer.
Listing 3.9 Global escape Linux example 2
static char *irc_buffer;// global declaration
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static int __init nf_conntrack_irc_init(void) {
int i, ret;
if (max_dcc_channels < 1) {
return -EINVAL;
}
irc_exp_policy.max_expected = max_dcc_channels;
irc_exp_policy.timeout = dcc_timeout;
irc_buffer = kmalloc (65536 , GFP_KERNEL);
if (! irc_buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
/* If no port given , default to standard irc port */
if (ports_c == 0)
ports[ports_c ++] = IRC_PORT;
for (i = 0; i < ports_c; i++) {
//some code
}
return 0;
}
4. Escape through function pointer(FPEsc): We have found 36 instances of mem-
ory allocation as shown in ﬁgure 3.4 in which the pointer to allocated memory is
escaped to another function(f) . The function f is called using function pointer.
Function pointers makes it diﬃcult to track which function is called using conven-
tional call ﬂow graphs. It is easy to build a call graph of A-calls-B when the call
statement explicitly mentions B. It is much harder to handle indirect calls. Listing
3.10 shows one of many such cases from Linux kernel.
Listing 3.10 Escape through function pointer Linux example 1
struct dm_dirty_log *dm_dirty_log_create(const char *type_name ,
struct dm_target *ti , int (* flush_callback_fn)(struct
dm_target *ti),
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unsigned int argc , char **argv) {
struct dm_dirty_log_type *type;
struct dm_dirty_log *log;
log = kmalloc(sizeof (*log), GFP_KERNEL);
//some code
log ->flush_callback_fn = flush_callback_fn;
log ->type = type;
if (type ->ctr(log , ti , argc , argv)) {
kfree(log);
put_type(type);
return NULL;
}
return log;
}
Figure 3.2 Possible calls by function pointer
In listing 3.10 the variable log is allocated and then passed as parameter to another
function using call to function pointer type− > ctr. Call through function pointer
is not a direct(static) function call, in a way that the information about the function
present in function pointer has to be extracted. Figure 3.2 shows the list of possible
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functions that can be called by calling type− > ctr function pointer. Determining
which speciﬁc function is called needs accurate data ﬂow analysis of function pointer
variable.
Listing 3.11 shows another example of such IDF pattern.
Listing 3.11 Escape through function pointer Linux example 2
static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view , long signr , size_t *total)
{
//some code
for (i = 1; i < view ->n; ++i) {
//some code
void *data = kmalloc(size , GFP_KERNEL);
ret = regset ->get(t->task , regset , 0, size , data ,
NULL);
//some code
}
return 1;
}
5. Escape by a pointer to a Field of Structure(SFEsc):
(a) We have found 10 example cases of SFEsc pattern in Linux. Listing 3.12
shows an example of SFEsc pattern. In listing 3.12, structure gcred points
to the allocated memory and only the address of its ﬁeld gcred− > gc base
is returned to the caller function. The caller of generic create cred now have
the reference of one of the ﬁeld of the structure gcred.
Listing 3.12 Escape by a pointer to a ﬁeld of structure Linux example 1
static struct rpc_cred * generic_create_cred(struct rpc_auth *
auth , struct auth_cred *acred , int flags) {
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struct generic_cred *gcred;
gcred = kmalloc(sizeof (*gcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (gcred == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rpcauth_init_cred (&gcred ->gc_base ,acred ,& generic_auth
,& generic_credops);
gcred ->gc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE
;
gcred ->acred.uid = acred ->uid;
gcred ->acred.gid = acred ->gid;
gcred ->acred.group_info = acred ->group_info;
gcred ->acred.ac_flags = 0;
if (gcred ->acred.group_info != NULL)
get_group_info(gcred ->acred.group_info);
gcred ->acred.machine_cred = acred ->machine_cred;
gcred ->acred.principal = acred ->principal;
dprintk("RPC:allocatedscredpforuiddgidd\n",gcred ->acred.
machine_cred?"machine": "generic",gcred ,
from_kuid (& init_user_ns , acred ->uid),
from_kgid (& init_user_ns , acred ->gid));
return &gcred ->gc_base;
}
The allocated memory is freed in the function generic_free_cred() as shown
in listing 3.13. container of is a macro deﬁned in Linux which uses pointer
arithmetic to determine address of allocated memory of structure type s from
its ﬁeld address. In the current example as shown in listing 3.13, the address
of allocated memory of structure generic cred(represented by gcred) is cal-
culated from the variable cred (which holds the address of gcred− > gcbase
)by subtracting its oﬀset value from the cred .The oﬀset value is simply the
number of bytes a ﬁeld of structure is away from the start of the structure.
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Listing 3.14 shows the generic macro which is used in Linux for calculating
the oﬀset.
Listing 3.13 Freeing by oﬀset calculation
static void generic_free_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred) {
struct generic_cred *gcred = container_of(cred , struct
generic_cred , gc_base);
if (gcred ->acred.group_info != NULL)
put_group_info(gcred ->acred.group_info);
kfree(gcred);
}
Listing 3.14 Linux container of macro example
#define container_of(ptr , type , member) ({\
const typeof( ((type *)0)->member ) *__mptr = (ptr
);\
(type *)( (char *) __mptr - offsetof(type ,member) )
;
})
Listings 3.15 and 3.16 shows more examples of SFEsc.
Listing 3.15 Escape through a ﬁeld of structure Linux example 2
static struct cache_deferred_req *svc_defer(struct cache_req *
req) {
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = container_of(req , struct
svc_rqst , rq_chandle);
struct svc_deferred_req *dr;
if (rqstp ->rq_arg.page_len || !rqstp ->rq_usedeferral)
return NULL; /* if more than a page , give up
FIXME */
if (rqstp ->rq_deferred) {
22
dr = rqstp ->rq_deferred;
rqstp ->rq_deferred = NULL;
} else {
size_t skip;
size_t size; /* FIXME maybe discard
if size too large */
size = sizeof(struct svc_deferred_req) + rqstp
->rq_arg.len;
dr = kmalloc(size , GFP_KERNEL);
//some code
}
svc_xprt_get(rqstp ->rq_xprt);
dr->xprt = rqstp ->rq_xprt;
rqstp ->rq_dropme = true;
dr->handle.revisit = svc_revisit;
return &dr ->handle;
}
Listing 3.16 Escape through a ﬁeld of structure Linux example 3
void alloc_acpi_hp_work(acpi_handle handle , u32 type , void *
context , void (*func)(struct work_struct *work)) {
struct acpi_hp_work *hp_work;
int ret;
hp_work = kmalloc(sizeof (* hp_work), GFP_KERNEL);
if (! hp_work)
return;
hp_work ->handle = handle;
hp_work ->type = type;
hp_work ->context = context;
INIT_WORK (&hp_work ->work , func);
ret = queue_work(kacpi_hotplug_wq , &hp_work ->work);
if (!ret)
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kfree(hp_work);
}
(b) There is no need to calculate the oﬀset if the pointer to the address of ﬁrst
ﬁeld is escaped. This is because the address of ﬁrst ﬁeld of a structure is
same as that of parent structure. As shown in listing 3.17 variable p of type
proc_mount is allocated in mounts_open_common() function. One of the
highlighted line shows that the allocated memory is escaped to file parameter
when address of ﬁrst ﬁeld of p is assigned to ﬁle->private_data.
Listing 3.17 Escape through a ﬁeld of structure special case
static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode , struct
file *file ,int (*show)(struct seq_file *, struct
vfsmount *)){
struct proc_mounts *p;
//some code//
*p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts),
GFP_KERNEL);
file ->private_data = &p->m;//the allocated
variable is escaped to file structure
//some code
}
Listing 3.18 shows the way allocated memory address is retrieved and freed.
In line 2 pointer m points to the starting address of allocated proc_mount
structure. This is because file− > private data contains the address of the
ﬁrst ﬁeld of proc_mount structure and the ﬁrst ﬁeld of any structure will have
the same address as that of parent structure. So in line 4 when kfree(m) is
called this will actually free the memory allocated to pointer p of listing 3.17
although the pointer m is declared of type seq file and not the original type
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proc mounts.
Listing 3.18 Deallocation of memory pointed by ﬁeld of structure
1 int seq_release(struct inode *inode , struct file *file) {
2 struct seq_file *m = file ->private_data;
3 kvfree(m->buf);
4 kfree(m);
5 return 0;
6 }
The diﬀerence between the previous two example cases discussed, lies in the way
the pointer to the allocated memory is extracted from its ﬁeld. In example shown in
listing 3.13, using container of macro the pointer to allocated memory is retrieved
which is of same type as that of allocated structure(generic cred in our case), but
in case of second example the pointer of allocated variable when retrieved is not
of the same type as that of allocated structure. This case uses the fact that the
address of ﬁrst ﬁeld of a structure can be used to free the parent structure. So
although the type of variable m in listing 3.18 is not that of proc mounts still call
to kfree(m) will free the memory allocated to pointer p of type proc mounts. An
attempt to match the allocation and deallocation sites by matching the types of
pointers involved may work (albeit with false positives) in example (a), however,
such a strategy will fail in case (b).
For memory leak analysis SFEsc pattern involves additional complexity of recov-
ering the address of allocated memory of structure from its ﬁeld address.
6. Escape by a Pointer inserted in a Linked List(LLEsc): We have found 69
instances of memory allocation in which the pointer to allocated memory is escaped
by adding it to Linked List. In the example shown in listing 3.19, it can be seen
25
that the address of List which is a ﬁeld of allocated structure &new− > list is
added to global list nfs_referral_count_list.
Listing 3.19 Escape by a pointer inserted in a linked list Linux example 1
static int nfs_referral_loop_protect(void) {
struct nfs_referral_count *p, *new;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
new = kmalloc(sizeof (*new), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto out;
new ->task = current;
new ->referral_count = 1;
ret = 0;
spin_lock (& nfs_referral_count_list_lock);
p = nfs_find_referral_count ();
if (p != NULL) {
if (p->referral_count >= NFS_MAX_NESTED_REFERRALS)
ret = -ELOOP;
else
p->referral_count ++;
} else {
list_add (&new ->list , &nfs_referral_count_list);
new = NULL;
}
spin_unlock (& nfs_referral_count_list_lock);
kfree(new);
out:
return ret;
}
Listing 3.20 shows method nfs referral loop unprotect which fetches the allo-
cated variable from global list (corresponding to the memory allocation in listing
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3.19, and frees it. Here, method nfs find referral count is called which tra-
verses the global list nfs referral count list and returns the pointer to the cur-
rent nfs referral count variable. The returned pointer (variable p in Listing 3.20)
points to the memory location to be freed. Listing 3.21 shows another example of
such IDF pattern.
Listing 3.20 Dereferencing pointer from list
static void nfs_referral_loop_unprotect(void) {
struct nfs_referral_count *p;
spin_lock (& nfs_referral_count_list_lock );
p = nfs_find_referral_count ();
p->referral_count --;
if (p->referral_count == 0)
list_del (&p->list);
else
p = NULL;
spin_unlock (& nfs_referral_count_list_lock );
kfree(p);
}
Listing 3.21 Escape by a pointer inserted in a linked list Linux example 2
static void quirk_awe32_add_ports(struct pnp_dev *dev ,struct
pnp_option *option , unsigned int offset) {
struct pnp_option *new_option;
new_option = kmalloc(sizeof(struct pnp_option), GFP_KERNEL
);
if (! new_option) {
return;
}
*new_option = *option;
new_option ->u.port.min += offset;
new_option ->u.port.max += offset;
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list_add (&new_option ->list , &option ->list);
pnp_option_set(option));
}
In addition to the challenges mentioned for base IDF patterns for memory leak
analysis, the additional challenge involves in handling LLEsc IDF pattern is that
the static analysis tool needs to check that all the references to the allocated mem-
ory that has been added to the collection(List) should be freed eventually. There
is no easy way to track the individual memory reference once it is added to the list.
For example in the example shown in listing 3.20 on completion of each task the
pointer to the allocated memory p is removed from the list and then freed using
kfree(). So each time when reference to the allocated memory is recovered from
the list, it is freed immediately after deleting the reference from the list.Thus at the
end when all the pointers to the allocated memory are deleted, their is no memory
reference left unfree.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows the frequency distribution of IDF patterns in Linux. Appendix
at the end list all the functions in Linux analyzed for empirical study.
Note: There are 11 instances of memory allocation in which the pointer to the allo-
cated memory is escaped through combination of PEsc and LLEsc. i.e. PEsc ∩ LLEsc
= 11. Similarly, LLEsc ∩ REsc = 4, LLEsc ∩ GEsc = 1 and FPEsc ∩ PEsc = 30. Also
we have found 13 instances of memory allocation in which the pointer to the allocated
memory does not escape from the function. i.e. there is no inter-procedural data ﬂow
involved for such instances of memory allocation. So total memory instances analyzed
are 708 + 117 + 13 = 838.
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Figure 3.3 Frequency distribution of IDF patterns PEsc, REsc, GEsc
Figure 3.4 Frequency distribution of IDF patterns SFEsc, LLEsc, FPEsc
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CHAPTER 4. STUDY OF MEMORY LEAK FIXES IN
LINUX KERNEL
We performed this study to check the IDF patterns associated with memory leak
bug ﬁxes in Linux. In order to analyze memory leak related bug ﬁxes in Linux we chose
Linux git repository.
We use the git version control for Linux to check for the commits that are related to
memory leaks. We have analyzed 1200 cases of memory leak related commits.
After setting up the Linux repository we searched all the commits that are related
to memory leaks. We used 'git log grep=memory leak ' command to search for all the
logs of commits that contain the word memory leak. We then manually analyzed each
commit to check if the ﬁx provided for the bug is related to memory leak. With this
we found 1200 cases of memory leak related bug ﬁxes in the master branch. We then
analyzed each case to check if there exists any pattern for such ﬁxes.
4.1 Results
Out of 1200 bug ﬁxes we found a pattern of bug ﬁxes that are related to providing
ﬁx in error path of a method. The example for such cases is shown in listing 4.1.
Listing 4.1 Memory leak ﬁx in error path example 1
struct vport *ovs_vport_alloc(int priv_size , const struct vport_ops *
ops , const struct vport_parms *parms) {
vport = kzalloc(alloc_size , GFP_KERNEL);
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//some code
if (ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids(vport , parms ->upcall_portids))
{
kfree(vport);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
//some code
return vport;
}
Listing 4.2 shows another case of memory leak ﬁx provided in error path. The line
in orange color is deleted, lines in yellow color are added after the ﬁx.
Listing 4.2 Memory leak ﬁx in error path example 2
static int pxa_ssp_probe(struct snd_soc_dai *dai) {
//some code
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ssp_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
//some code
ssp_handle = of_parse_phandle(dev ->of_node , "port", 0);
if (! ssp_handle) {
return -ENODEV;
ret -ENODEV;
goto err_priv;
}
//some code
err_priv:
kfree(priv);
return ret;
}
Examples in listings 4.1 and 4.2 shows that the pointer to the allocated memory is
either passed to another function through parameter which involves PEsc IDF pattern
or it is not escaped at all which is the case of intra-procedural data ﬂow.
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There also exists a pattern of bug ﬁxes in which memory allocated to a structure
is freed without freeing the memory allocated to its ﬁeld and vice versa, an example is
shown in listing 4.3.
Listing 4.3 Partial memory free example 1
void kvm_arch_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
hrtimer_cancel (&vcpu ->arch.comparecount_timer);
kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
kvm_mips_dump_stats(vcpu);
kfree(vcpu ->arch.guest_ebase);
kfree(vcpu ->arch.kseg0_commpage);
kfree(vcpu);
}
Listing 4.4 shows an example in which developer frees the memory associated with
structure without freeing its member's memory. So the colored statement shown in the
ﬁgure is added to ﬁx the associated memory leak.
Listing 4.4 Partial memory free example 2
void sta_info_free(struct ieee80211_local *local , struct sta_info *sta)
{
if (sta ->rate_ctrl)
rate_control_free_sta(sta);
kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(sta ->sta.rates));
kfree(sta);
}
The IDF pattern involved in examples shown in listings 4.3 and 4.4 is PEsc because
the pointer to the allocated memory is the argument of the function called to free the
memory.
Listing 4.5 shows LLEsc IDF pattern involved in memory leak bug ﬁx. The list
info− > zone list is traversed using the macro list for each entry safe and the ref-
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erence to the allocated memory is recovered from the list which is then freed in the
statement kfree(publ);
Listing 4.5 LLEsc IDF pattern associated with bug ﬁx
static void tipc_purge_publications(struct name_seq *seq) {
struct publication *publ , *safe;
struct sub_seq *sseq;
struct name_info *info;
if (!seq ->sseqs) {
nameseq_delete_empty(seq);
return;
}
sseq = seq ->sseqs;
info = sseq ->info;
list_for_each_entry_safe(publ ,safe ,&info ->zone_list ,zone_list){
tipc_nametbl_remove_publ(publ ->type ,publ ->lower ,publ ->node ,
publ ->ref , publ ->key);
kfree(publ);
}
}
All the bug ﬁxes that we have analyzed have IDF patterns out of the six patterns
that we have characterized in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5. STUDY OF STATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS
In this section we present analysis of our literature survey on static analysis tools to
see the IDF patterns associated with example cases in which tools claims to ﬁx memory
leaks.
The paper by Sui et al Sui et al. (2012) developed a tool called SABER which uses
sparse value ﬂow analysis to detect memory leaks in C programs. Sparse value ﬂow
analysis is diﬀerent from data ﬂow analysis. The later tracks the ﬂow of values iteratively
at each point through the control ﬂow while the former tracks the ﬂow of values sparsely
through def-use chains or SSA(Static Single Assignment) form. Figure 5.1 shows a leaky
code in icecast software in which the memory is allocated at lines 174 and 176. The
pointer ”entry” to the allocated memory is then passed as parameter to the function
avl insert function. The leak is in one of the error path at line 122 where the function
simply returns without freeing the memory. This scenario involves PEsc IDF pattern.
Figure 5.2 shows a leaky code from wine software. In functionOLEPictureImpl LoadGif ,
GifOpen is called at line 1021 so that two heap objects are allocated at lines 898 and 905.
One of the two objects is passed to gif and the other to the ﬁeld private of GifFile. At the
end of OLEPictureImpl LoadGif , there is a call to DGifCloseF ile to free the two ob-
jects. However, there is a test at line 1030 sitting between the two calls. The two objects
are never freed when this test evaluates to true. This scenario involves REsc IDF pattern
as the pointer GifFile is assigned to the allocated memory in function DGIFOPEN()
and is returned to the caller of DGIFOPEN() through return statement.
The paper by Yungbum Jung and Yi (2008) Jung developed a tool called SPARROW
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Figure 5.1 Memory leak handled by SABER tool example 1
that detects memory leaks in C programs using function summaries. The tool summarize
each function while preserving its memory behavior. This function summary is then
used at each call site of the function to analyze memory behavior inter-procedurally.
There are many examples in the paper showing the representation of summaries when
the allocated memory is returned to the caller function. Figure 5.3 shows a code from
mesa program containing two memory leaks. First leak occurs at line 273 when in one
of the error path, function returns without freeing the pointer osmesa. The second leaks
occurs when some heap allocations by the function g1 create context are not freed by the
function g1 destroy_context. To detect such leak, analysis of both g1 create context
and g1 destroy_context functions is required. The tool in the paper claims to detect
both memory leaks. It can be interpreted from the example that the tool can handle both
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Figure 5.2 Memory leak handled by SABER tool example 2
REsc and PEsc IDF patterns because function g1 create context returns the reference
to the allocated memory and this reference is passed as parameter to the function
g1 destroy_context for deallocation.
The paper by Yichen Xie and Aiken (2005) developed a tool called SATURN that
can perform path and context sensitive memory leak analysis, in addition to detecting
memory leaks in error paths of a function's control ﬂow. The tool uses abstraction
and boolean satisﬁability to achieve inter-procedural path sensitivity. Figure 5.4 shows
example cases of memory leaks that SATURN claims to detect. Part (a) of the code in
ﬁgure 5.4 shows the memory leaks occurs in error path which does not involve any IDF
pattern. In part (b) the reference to the allocated memory is returned and is assigned
to the pointer longfilename. In part (c) the pointer to the allocated memory is passed
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Figure 5.3 Memory leaks handled by SPARROW tool
to another function through parameter. Clearly the example shown in part (b) and (c)
involves REsc and PEsc IDF pattern respectively.
Figure 5.4 Memory leaks handled by SATURN tool
The paper by Sigmund Cherem et al. (2007) et al presents a technique that tracks the
ﬂow of values from allocation points to deallocation points using a sparse representation
of the program consisting of a value ﬂow graph. This graph captures def-use relations
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and value ﬂows via program assignments. Figure 5.5 shows an example of leaky code
which is claimed to be handled by the tool. At line 292 call to concat() function allocates
the memory(as shown at line 58), the reference to which is returned and stored in object
f list . Next line 293 calls concat() again which overwrites f list with the reference
to the new memory location, the reference to the old memory is thus lost resulting in
memory leak. Fixing this memory leak involves handling of REsc IDF pattern.
Figure 5.5 Leaky code example
It can be seen from the above analysis that no new IDF pattern is involved in the
examples covered by the papers on static analysis tools.
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CHAPTER 6. RELATED WORK
Kang Gui and Suraj Kothari Gui and Kothari (2010) identiﬁed two patterns indicative
of good software design with respect to matching pair property such as memory leak.
The empirical study of Linux kernel is done to check the existence of such patterns.
Andy Chou et al. Chou et al. (2001) presented the result of the empirical study of
Operating System errors in Linux kernel. The study discussed various parameters of
software bugs like life time of a bug, distribution of software bugs in Linux Kernel etc.
Also the study presented how the bugs like memory leaks, null pointer de-referencing etc
are distributed across the various modules of Linux kernel.
Neil Brown Brown (2009) discussed various design patterns used in the development
of Linux kernel. The patterns deals with the life time of object. The article also relates
how the understanding of design patterns is important for memory leak analysis.
Dor et al. use Dor et al. (2000) TVLA, a shape analysis tool based on 3-valued
logic, to prove the absence of memory leaks and other memory errors in several list
manipulation programs. The paper also presents challenges for memory leak analysis
if list manipulation is involved, similar to the LLEsc pattern we discussed. Their anal-
ysis veriﬁes these programs successfully, but is intra-procedural and cannot be applied
to recursive and multi-procedure programs. Of these analysis [Heine and Lam (2003),
Hackett and Rugina (2005)] target referencing leaks; and [Xie and Aiken (2005), Dor
et al. (2000)] target reach-ability leaks.
Winter Winter et al. (2013) et al. presented path sensitive data ﬂow analysis to
verify memory leaks. Hind et al. Hind et al. (1999) presented ﬂow sensitive algorithm
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for Inter-procedural pointer alias analysis. The paper also presents techniques to track
the pointer in the presence of function pointers.
In addition to the papers discussed in section ﬁve, Das et al. Das et al. (2002) and
Engler at al. Engler et al. (2000) employs data ﬂow analysis techniques to statically verify
memory leaks. In addition to that there are some open source tools like [Marjamaki,
Cla, Spl] that are used to detect memory leaks in software systems. Similarly Sparse
static analysis Spa tool is speciﬁcally implemented to ﬁnd fault in Linux Kernel.
Nathaniel et al Ayewah et al. (2007) evaluated the accuracy of static analysis tools
by analyzing the warnings provided by the tools.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
We have observed various ways in which a pointer to the allocated memory escapes
from one function to other. We have categorized such escape cases into six Inter-
procedural Data Flow(IDF) patterns. We have discussed about the challenges involved
in memory leak analysis in the presence of each pattern. Our study of memory leak
bug ﬁxes in Linux kernel and the leaks that can be detected by current state of the art
static analysis tools reveals four out of six patterns which we have identiﬁed. We believe
that such IDF patterns will serve as a reference to static analysis tools to achieve higher
accuracy for performing automated memory leak analysis.
41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Clang: Static analysis tool. http://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/. 39
Sparse: Static analysis tool for linux kernel. http://kernelnewbies.org/Sparse/. 39
Splint: Static analysis tool for c. http://splint.org/. 39
Ayewah, N., Pugh, W., Morgenthaler, J. D., Penix, J., and Zhou, Y. (2007). Evaluat-
ing static analysis defect warnings on production software. In Proceedings of the 7th
ACM SIGPLAN-SIGSOFT Workshop on Program Analysis for Software Tools and
Engineering, PASTE '07, pages 18, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 39
Brown, N. (2009). Comprehensive and eﬃcient protection of kernel control data. Infor-
mation Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on. 38
Cherem, S., Princehouse, L., and Rugina, R. (2007). Practical memory leak detection
using guarded value-ﬂow analysis. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGPLAN Confer-
ence on Programming Language Design and Implementation, PLDI '07, pages 480491,
New York, NY, USA. ACM. 36
Chou, A., Yang, J., Chelf, B., Hallem, S., and Engler, D. (2001). An empirical study
of operating systems errors. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth ACM Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles, SOSP '01, pages 7388, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 38
Das, M., Lerner, S., and Seigle, M. (2002). Esp: Path-sensitive program veriﬁcation in
polynomial time. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 37, pages 5768. ACM. 39
42
Dor, N., Rodeh, M., and Sagiv, S. (2000). Checking cleanness in linked lists. In Static
Analysis, 7th International Symposium, SAS 2000, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, June 29
- July 1, 2000, Proceedings, pages 115134. 38
Engler, D., Chelf, B., Chou, A., and Hallem, S. (2000). Checking system rules using
system-speciﬁc, programmer-written compiler extensions. In Proceedings of the 4th
Conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume
4, OSDI'00, pages 11, Berkeley, CA, USA. USENIX Association. 39
Gui, K. and Kothari, S. (2010). An Empirical Study to Discover Patterns for Checking the
Matching Pair Property. In International Conference on Computational Intelligence
and Software Engineering. 38
Hackett, B. and Rugina, R. (2005). Region-based shape analysis with tracked locations.
In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 40, pages 310323. ACM. 38
Heine, D. L. and Lam, M. S. (2003). A practical ﬂow-sensitive and context-sensitive c
and c++ memory leak detector. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 38(5):168181. 38
Hind, M., Burke, M., Carini, P., and deok Choi, J. (1999). Interprocedural pointer alias
analysis. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 21. 38
Jung, Y. and Yi, K. (2008). Practical memory leak detector based on parameterized
procedural summaries. In Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Memory
Management, ISMM '08, pages 131140, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 33
Marjamaki, D. Cppcheck: Static analysis tool. 39
Sui, Y., Ye, D., and Xue, J. (2012). Static memory leak detection using full-sparse
value-ﬂow analysis. In Proceedings of the 2012 International Symposium on Software
Testing and Analysis, ISSTA 2012, pages 254264, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 33
43
Winter, K., Zhang, C., Hayes, I. J., Keynes, N., Cifuentes, C., and Li, L. (2013). Path-
sensitive data ﬂow analysis simpliﬁed. In Formal Methods and Software Engineering,
pages 415430. Springer. 38
Xie, Y. and Aiken, A. (2005). Context- and path-sensitive memory leak detection. SIG-
SOFT Softw. Eng. Notes, 30(5):115125. 35, 38
44
APPENDIX. FUNCTIONS IN LINUX ANALYZED FOR
EMPIRICAL STUDY
This appendix will list all the functions that have been analyzed in Linux to ﬁnd
IDF patterns, further we have categorized each function with the type of IDF pattern
associated with the pointer to the allocated memory in the function.
• Functions in which the allocated variable escape through IDF Pattern SFEsc are:
Table .1 Functions involve SFEsc IDF pattern
Function Pointer to the allocated memory
i915_gem_set_tiling obj.bit_17
mounts_open_common p
svc_defer dr
rsc_alloc rsci
ip_map_alloc i
generic_create_cred gcred
svcauth_gss_register_pseudoﬂavor new
unix_domain_ﬁnd new
spi_schedule_dv_device wqw
sock_alloc_inode wq
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• Functions in which the allocated variable escape through IDF Pattern LLEsc are:
Table .2 Functions involve LLEsc IDF pattern
Function Pointer to the allocated memory
__i915_add_request request
create_pid_cachep pcache
drm_prime_add_buf_handle member
serio_queue_event event
scsi_complete_async_scans data
open bb.buﬀer
pm_vt_switch_required entry
drm_add_fake_info_node node
__hw_addr_create_ex ha
acpi_add_id id
region_chg nrg
drm_addctx ctx_entry
usb_driver_set_conﬁguration req
register_kretprobe inst
read_cis_cache cis
postﬁx_append_op elt
usbhid_modify_dquirk q_new
kcore_update_ram ent
usb_hub_clear_tt_buﬀer clear
add_conn_list p
postﬁx_append_operand elt
sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall buf
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• Functions in which the allocated variable escape through IDF Pattern FPEsc are:
Table .3 Functions involve FPEsc IDF pattern
Function Pointer to the allocated memory
ethtool_get_stats data
seq_read m.size
seq_read m.buf
cgroup_write_string buﬀer
genl_family_rcv_msg attrbuf
setkey_unaligned buﬀer
ﬁfo_set_limit nla
xfrm_user_policy data
slave_update uctl
e1000_dump_eeprom data
pneigh_lookup n
inode_doinit_with_dentry context
soft_cursor ops.cursor_src
ahash_def_ﬁnup priv
con_font_get font.data
ethtool_set_eeprom data
hidinput_led_worker buf
shash_setkey_unaligned buﬀer
snd_mixer_oss_build_input uinfo
rngapi_reset buf
ethtool_self_test data
snd_mixer_oss_build_test info
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Table .4 Functions involve multiple IDF patterns
Functions Pointer to the allocated memory IDF Pattern
__netpoll_setup npinfo LLEsc, FPEsc
agp_3_5_enable cur SFEsc, LLEsc
Complete list of functions for each IDF pattern is publicly shared at:
https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B2krxqxu-hmXVEpxM01TVXdNN1E&usp=
drive_web
